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Fisher v. University of Texas: Race
Preference in University Admissions
Survives Another Round
By LINO A. GRAGLIA*
THE FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS at Austin1 case presents the
issue of whether a state university may give admission preference to
some applicants on the basis of their race, thereby disadvantaging
other applicants on the basis of their race. For most Americans, the
answer should be clear. Official race discrimination is inconsistent
with the American ideal that all persons are equal before the law and
must be treated as individuals, rather than as members of racial
groups. Everyone thought Brown v. Board of Education2 made official
race discrimination unconstitutional. Further, Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act3 makes official race discrimination illegal for any insti-
tution receiving federal funds, such as the University of Texas and
nearly all other colleges.4
Why then is race discrimination by a state institution still an issue?
The answer is that the end of segregation and official race discrimina-
tion turned out to be a disappointment or even an embarrassment for
civil rights professionals. While blacks were no longer lawfully ex-
cluded by law from the University of Texas, still very few attended. A
movement therefore arose to move from prohibiting racial discrimi-
nation to exclude blacks to permitting or requiring racial discrimina-
tion to include them.
The source of the problem can be traced to poor black academic
performance. The grim but inescapable fact is that in subjects such as
reading and math the average black twelfth grader performs years be-
* A. W. Walker Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin School of
Law.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–h (2012)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
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hind the average white twelfth grader.5 Therefore, it is unsurprising
that very few blacks meet the admission standards of selective schools.
The more serious problem with this poor academic performance, as
Dr. Cantor points out, is high school graduation.6
Instead of attempting to address the problem of poor academic
achievement by blacks, institutions of higher education attempt to
conceal or overcome it by simply reducing admissions standards for
blacks. This reduction serves the schools’ objective of avoiding the em-
barrassment of an all, or nearly all, non-black student body. However,
by engaging in this practice, the schools violate principles of justice
and harm rather than help the preferred blacks.
The practice of reducing admissions standards in effect adopts as
official policy the view that blacks cannot meet or be expected to meet
the same admissions requirements applicable to whites and Asians.
This policy is inconsistent with interracial respect and could reduce
academic confidence and effort for black students. In addition, pref-
erential racial treatment raises suspicion as to, and demeans, the ac-
complishments of all blacks. Further, it raises the question of group
racial differences, which a policy of race neutrality thankfully makes
irrelevant.7 Finally, it is a prescription for continuing racial hostility, as
white and Asian students will never acquiesce to being placed at an
educational disadvantage.
How, then, can the practice of race preference in college admis-
sions be justified? It was once claimed that the ordinary admission
standards—SAT score and high school GPA—were “culturally biased”
5. See STEPHEN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE
357 (1997).
[In 1994], the average African-American high school senior had math skills pre-
cisely on a par with those of the typical white in the middle of the ninth
grade . . . .
. . . [B]lacks aged seventeen could read as well on the average as the typical
white child who was a month past his or her thirteenth birthday.
. . . Blacks in the twelfth grade could deal with scientific problems at the level
of whites in the sixth grade and write about as well as whites in the eighth grade.
Id.
6. Nancy Cantor, From Grutter to Fisher and Beyond: The Compelling Interest of Diversity in
Higher Education, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 263 (2014) (citing NANCY MCARDLE, THERESA
OSYPUK & DOLORES ACEVEDO-GARCI´A, DIVERSITYDATA.ORG, SEGREGATION AND EXPOSURE TO
HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS IN LARGE METROPOLITAN AREAS: 2008–2009, at 12 (2010), http://di
versitydata.sph.harvard.edu/Publications/school_segregation_report.pdf).
7. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 474 (1994) (implementing a policy of race neutral-
ity makes the question of inherent difference between racial groups irrelevant).
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against some racial minorities.8 It is now clear, however, that blacks do
not out-perform other racial groups when comparing their admission
scores; in fact, they tend, unfortunately, to underperform them.9 Fur-
ther, the claim that race preference is necessary to correct the “under-
representation” of blacks on campus is invalid. First, because selective
schools are not meant to be representative institutions, and second,
because the underrepresentation argument is not a justification but a
tautology: we must admit more blacks in order to have more blacks.
Not only is this an inadequate justification for engaging in race prefer-
ence but, according to the Supreme Court, it “would amount to out-
right racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional”10 and would
simply be race discrimination “for its own sake.”11
Moreover, race preference cannot be justified as a remedy for
being disadvantaged. One cannot remedy an injury to one person by
providing a benefit to a different person. Race is not a proxy for disad-
vantage, because not all and not only blacks have been disadvantaged.
Further, preferential admission to selective schools is not a program
for the disadvantaged, but rather, almost always, only for the most ad-
vantaged. The University of Texas at Austin School of Law, for exam-
ple, has never denied a black applicant preferential admission
because he or she was not disadvantaged or, indeed, exceptionally ad-
vantaged. The result is that a black applicant with well-off professional
class parents will be granted admission over a better-qualified white
applicant with working-class parents with a grade-school education.
Only academic administrators fail to see the injustice of this. Any col-
lege or university truly interested in student body diversity should give
preference in admissions decisions on the basis of socio-economic sta-
tus, not race.
Apart from considerations of principle and justice, the use of race
preference in student admissions decisions should be rejected on the
practical ground that it actually serves more to harm than it does to
help the racially preferred students. The effect of race preference pro-
grams generally does not give the preferred students an opportunity
to get a standard college or university education. Instead, race prefer-
8. See, e.g., Roy O. Freedle, Correcting the SAT’s Ethnic and Social-class Bias: A Method for
Reestimating SAT Scores, 73 HARV. EDUC. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing racial bias in SAT scoring
and proposing a revised scoring method).
9. See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES 160–65 (1984).
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
11. See id. (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (referring to the unconstitutionality of using racially preferential admissions stan-
dards to meet a racial quota).
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ence places preferred students in a school more selective than a
school they would have otherwise attended. The result is a mismatch
of the student’s academic qualifications with the school’s ordinary ad-
missions requirements.12 Students are thus necessarily placed at an
academic disadvantage—and typically a large one.13 The result is that
black students are taken out of schools in which they could excel aca-
demically and placed in schools where they are almost sure to occupy
the bottom of the class.
Law professor and economist Richard Sander concluded that
“the production of black lawyers would rise significantly”14 and blacks
would be significantly “better off” if law schools did not practice race
discrimination.15 The nation has spent billions of dollars attempting
to encourage blacks and Latinos to study science and engineering—
with very little success.16 There is a simpler way to accomplish this
goal: abolish racially preferential admission to selective schools. Many
blacks and Latinos preferentially admitted to selective schools who en-
roll as science and engineering majors get discouraged and drop out
of those majors when they cannot keep up with the class.17 At a less
selective school, these students would be more likely to keep pace with
their peers, enhancing the chances that they will graduate and even
go on to pursue a graduate degree.18 It is not surprising that students
perform better in schools for which they are fully qualified than in
schools for which they are not. If the goal is to facilitate the movement
of blacks into the economic and educational mainstream, racially
12. See RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH 4–5 (2013).
13. E.g., Brief Amici Curiae for Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. in Support of
Neither Party at 3–4, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-
345) (“For example, among freshmen entering the University of Texas at Austin in 2009
who were admitted outside the top-ten-percent system, the mean SAT score (on a scale of
2400) of Asians was a staggering 467 points above (and the mean score of whites was 390
points above) the mean black score. In percentile terms, these Asians scored at the 93rd
percentile of 2009 SAT takers nationwide, whites at the 89th percentile, Hispanics at the
80th percentile, and blacks at the 52nd percentile.”); see also Thomas. J. Espenshade et al.,
Admission Preferences for Minority Students, Athletes, and Legacies at Elite Universities, 85 SOC. SCI.
Q. 1422 (2004).
14. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,
57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 476 (2004).
15. Id. at 482.
16. Peter Arcidiacono et al., What Happens After Enrollment?, IZA J. LAB. ECON. 1, 20
(2012).
17. Id.
18. See Rogers Elliot et al., The Role of Ethnicity in Choosing and Leaving Science in Highly
Selective Institutions, 37 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC. 681, 684 (1996); Arcidiacono et al., supra note
16.
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preferential college and university admission is not merely unhelpful;
it is counterproductive.
The Supreme Court first ruled on the issue of affirmative action
in the famous—or infamous—Bakke case in 1978.19 Four justices
would have held, correctly, that Title VI prohibited the federally
funded school’s use of racial discrimination in admissions decisions.20
This determination would have resolved the case without requiring
the Court to consider the question of whether affirmative action is
constitutional. The other five justices insisted, however, that Title VI
did not mean what it said21—that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race . . . be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”22 They
therefore were required to address the constitutional question. Four
justices would have held that strict scrutiny was not applicable to dis-
crimination meant to benefit blacks, and that its use by the school was
justified to remedy societal discrimination.23
The fifth Justice, Justice Powell, took the position that strict scru-
tiny applied to all official race discrimination, and that the term “soci-
etal discrimination” was too vague and uncertain to be a legitimate
justification.24 Harvard University,25 Justice Powell naı¨vely believed,
had found the answer to the Court’s dilemma: race discrimination is
permissible in higher education to meet a school’s compelling inter-
est in promoting student body diversity.26 Harvard argued, if it can
permissibly prefer a student from Montana to a student from New
York, why could it not prefer a black to a white?27 Apparently Harvard
had never heard of the Fourteenth Amendment. William J. Buckley Jr.
famously said that he would rather be governed by the first 2000
19. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
20. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 408.
21. Id. at 340.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
23. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, by concur-
ring in part with Powell’s majority, produced the five votes to reverse the judgment below
to prohibit the university from establishing race-conscious programs in the future.
24. Id. at 289.
25. Harvard University, along with Stanford University, Columbia University, and the
University of Pennsylvania, filed an Amicus Brief arguing race should be a permissible
factor to be considered in admissions decisions. Brief of Columbia University et al. as Amici
Curiae at 11, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76–811).
26. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322–23 (incorporating selected portions of Harvard University’s
Amicus Brief into the appendix to Justice Powell’s opinion).
27. Id. at 322.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\48-2\SAN202.txt unknown Seq: 6 29-MAY-14 7:28
278 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
names in the Boston phonebook than by the Harvard faculty.28 Unfor-
tunately, at least on the issue of race preference in college admissions,
we are effectively governed by the Harvard faculty.
Justice Powell’s peculiar one-man opinion became the law of ra-
cial preference in college and university admissions. It was raised to
the status of a majority opinion when the Court adopted it in its five-
to-four decision in Grutter v. Bollinger.29 There is very little basis, how-
ever, for Justice Powell’s claim. Very few people (except most speakers
at this symposium) believe that student body racial diversity—adding
a few more blacks to a class in place of better qualified whites and
Asians—is a compelling educational interest, as is required by the
strict scrutiny test the Grutter majority purported to apply. Nor does
anyone believe Justice O’Connor’s statement in Grutter that race pref-
erence can be expected to end in twenty-five years30 because more
blacks will then be able to meet the ordinary admission requirements.
Justice O’Connor’s statement was made ten years ago, and there is no
evidence that the racial academic achievement gap is closing.31
The central issue presented to the Court in Fisher32 was whether
to continue the diversity charade. If Justice Alito, who replaced Justice
O’Connor, had been on the Court that decided Grutter, the decision
would almost certainly have gone the other way. Since Grutter, the
Court has decided two important race discrimination cases: Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 133 and Ricci v.
DeStefano.34 The Court in Parents Involved held that a school district
could not consider race as a factor to increase integration, even when
choosing students for an oversubscribed high school.35 In Ricci—the
famous New Haven, Connecticut firefighter case—the Court held that
New Haven could not cancel a test to determine promotions when it
28. WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR., RUMBLES LEFT AND RIGHT: A BOOK ABOUT TROUBLESOME PEO-
PLE AND IDEAS 134 (1963).
29. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
30. Id. at 343.
31. Id. at 375–76 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
33. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
34. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
35. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747–48; see also Lino A. Graglia, Solving the Parents
Involved Paradox, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911 (2008) (discussing the seeming paradox that
the Constitution can require a school district to implement drastic measures that increase
racial integration in schools, while also prohibiting schools from considering race as a tie-
breaker for student assignments).
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appeared that no blacks would be promoted.36 In each case, the usual
conservative five-justice majority37 took a very strong anti-race discrim-
ination position. As Chief Justice John Roberts said in Parents Involved,
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop dis-
criminating on the basis of race.”38 That statement sounded as if it
meant the end of race preference in college admissions.
In addition, the University of Texas seemed to have an exception-
ally weak case. When the Fifth Circuit’s 1996 Hopwood39 decision pro-
hibited use of racial preference in determining admission to the
University of Texas School of Law,40 the Texas legislature enacted the
“Top Ten Percent Plan,” which guarantees admission to the (under-
graduate) University of Texas to all Texas students who graduate in
the top ten percent of their high school class.41 The students qualify-
ing under the plan account for over eighty percent of the entering
class, and the University of Texas is one of the most racially diverse
schools in the nation with blacks and Hispanics making up more than
twenty percent of the entering class.42
It seemed unlikely that the University of Texas would be able to
convince the Supreme Court in Fisher that race preference was none-
theless required to further increase the number of blacks and Hispan-
ics in its student body. The Court, however, in effect decided not to
decide. It reversed the lower court’s approval of the university’s use of
race, without deciding whether racial diversity is a compelling interest
justifying race preference.43 Rather than disallowing race preference,
as its opponents had hoped, the Court remanded the case with in-
structions for the lower court to apply strict scrutiny analysis to the
narrow tailoring issue in order to determine whether the university’s
purported compelling interest could be achieved without or with less
use of race.44
36. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563; see also Lino A. Graglia, Ricci v. Destafano: Even Whites Are A
Protected Class in the Roberts Court, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 573 (2012) (discussing the
constitutionality of the disparate impact provision in relation to Ricci v. DeStefano).
37. The author considers Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas,
and Alito to be conservative.
38. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. Justice Kennedy did not join this statement but
agreed on the “presumptive invalidity of a State’s use of racial classifications to differenti-
ate its treatment of individuals.” Id. at 793.
39. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
40. Id. at 935.
41. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 644 F.3d 301, 306 (5th Cir. 2011).
42. Id. at 306–07.
43. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421–22 (2013).
44. Id.
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Although Justice Kennedy’s opinion, joined by all the other jus-
tices except Justice Ginsberg,45 failed to completely disallow race pref-
erence, it clearly means to warn universities to strictly limit its use. The
opinion is unlikely to have any more limiting effect, however, than the
opinions of Justice Powell in Bakke or Justice O’Connor in Grutter. The
bottom line is that the use of race is still permitted in admissions deci-
sions. Such permission is all that selective schools need to continue to
pursue their overriding objective of avoiding an all, or nearly all, non-
black student body. They will continue to do so unless and until pro-
hibited by state law, or the Supreme Court definitively decides to put
an end to racially preferential admissions practices.
45. Justice Kagen did not participate in the opinion. Id. at 2414.
